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COMMENT 
CALIFORNIA'S CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION 
OF PATERNITY AND THE EXPANSION OF 
UNWED FATHERS' RIGHTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
California's conclusive presumption of paternity provides 
that when a mother is married and living with her husband at 
the time of conception, the husband is conclusively presumed 
to be her child's father.1 With only a few narrow exceptions, 
the conclusive presumption of paternity denies an unwed fa-
ther the opportunity to establish his paternity because he is 
precluded from offering evidence that the husband is not the 
father.2 
In a changing society, where divorce, remarriage, and 
single parent homes are increasingly prevalent,3 the California 
courts continue to struggle with the rights of the unwed father. 
Until recently, most unwed fathers could only attack the pre-
1. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 1994). Section 7540 provides: 
"Except as provided in Section 7541, the child of a wife cohabiting with her 
husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of 
the marriage." [d. 
2. A conclusive presumption bars all factual evidence to disprove the exis-
tence of the presumed fact. A conclusive presumption "[e]xists when an ultimate 
fact is presumed to be true upon proof of another fact, and no evidence, no matter 
how persuasive, can rebut it." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 434 (6th ed. 1991). 
3. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 79 tbl. 97, 80 tbl. 101 (114th ed. 1994). In 1991, 28 percent of births in 
the nation and 33.3 percent of the births in California were to unwed mothers. 
337 
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sumption on constitutional grounds.' Two California Appellate 
decisions have expanded the unwed father's right to challenge 
the presumption of the husband's paternity.5 In these cases, 
the two unwed fathers successfully rebutted the conclusive pre-
sumption of the husband's paternity by establishing their pre-
sumed father status under an exception to the California Fam-
ily Code section 7540 enacted in 1990.6 The courts in Comino 
v. Kelly and Steven W. v. Matthew S. gave this rebuttable pre-
sumption more strength than the critics predicted,7 allowing 
the presumed father to prove his relationship without having 
to mount a constitutional attack.8 
This comment begins with the history of the conclusive 
presumption of paternity in California, from its common law 
roots to its modern day affirmation in Michael H. v. Gerald D.9 
This background will discuss the adoption of the Uniform Par-
entage Act in California and its application in paternity pro-
ceedings. lo In an effort to advocate the need for its repeal, 
4. Before the statutory amendments of 1991, only the mother or her husband 
could move the court to consider blood test evidence in defense of the conclusive 
presumption of the husband's paternity. 
California Evidence Code section 621 provided in pertinent part: 
(c) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivi-
sion (b) may be raised by the husband not later than two 
years from the child's date of birth. 
(d) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivi-
sion (b) may be raised by the mother not later than two 
years from the child's date of birth if the child's biological 
father has flied an affidavit with the court acknowledging 
paternity of the child. 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(c)-(d) (West 1990), aTTumded by Ch. 543, § 2, replaced by 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540(b)-(c) (West 1994). 
5. Comino v. Kelly, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1994); Steven W. 
v. Matthew S., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1995). 
6. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1990), amended by Ch. 543, § 2, replaced by 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 1994). 
7. See Mindy S. Halpern, Comment, Father Knows Best . But Which Father? 
California's Presumption of Legitimacy Loses its Conclusiveness: Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D. and its Aftermath, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 275, 305 (1991). 
8. Camino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731, 732; Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538, 
539. In both cases, the courts granted the unwed father paternity rather than 
applying the conclusive presumption to the mother's husband. The courts applied 
section 7611(d) reasoning that a man who has a substantially developed relation-
ship with the child is the presumed father. Camino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731, 732; 
Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538, 539. 
9. Michael H. v. Gerald. D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
10. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 295 (West 1987 and Supp. 1995). 
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this comment will also discuss the modem trend in the Califor-
nia courts to circumvent the conclusive presumption.l1 
The comment then argues that California Family Code 
Section 7611(d)12, as a complement to section 7540, has prov-
en a viable statutory inroad for unwed fathers seeking paterni-
ty as evidenced in Comino v. Kelly13 and Steven W. v. Mat-
thew S.14 These two recent cases, along with section 7611(d), 
broadened the definition of a presumed father and the class of 
people who may contest the husband's paternity. Previously, 
California courts employed a fact-based balancing test of the 
private and state interests in particular familial relationships 
when the conclusive presumption of section 7540 was under 
constitutional attack. 15 Now, based on the rebuttable pre-
sumption found in section 7611(d), courts have given the estab-
lished parent-child relationships of at least two unwed fathers 
meaningful consideration when the husband or the child's 
mother attempted to use the conclusive presumption as a de-
fense to a paternity action by the natural father. IS 
The comment concludes that this rebuttable presumption 
enables an unwed father to establish his parental rights re-
gardless of the mother's marital status. By protecting devel-
oped parent-child relationships, California law has become 
more closely aligned with the Uniform Parentage Act, which 
aims to eliminate any differentiation between a married and 
an unmarried parent's legal relationship with the child. 17 The 
11. Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728; Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535; In re Me-
lissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 6 Dist. 1989); In re Guardianship of 
Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Cal. t. App. 1 Dist. 1990). See also Bonnie Baxt 
Silber, How Irrebuttable is the Irrebuttable Presumption of Paternity in Section 621 
of the California Evidence Code? An Examination of Michael H. v. Gerald D. and 
Its Aftermath in California, 13 J. Juv. L. 159 (1992). 
12. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 1994). Section 7611 states that a man 
may be presumed to be a child's father if, among other things, "[h]e receives the 
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child." Id. 
13. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1994). 
14. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1995). 
15. In re Lisa R., 532 P.2d 123 (1975). 
16. See Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728; Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535. 
17. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 295, 296 (West 1987 and Supp. 
1995). Section 2 provides: 
"The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to 
every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." Id. 
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courts have demonstrated the dwindling usefulness of the 
conclusive presumption in paternity disputes by placing great-
er importance on an assessment of the child's existing relation-
ships.ls 
II. BACKGROUND 
The conclusive presumption of paternity was introduced at 
common law in order to reduce instances of illegitimacy. The 
adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act in 1976 purportedly 
dispensed with the legal distinction of children based on the 
marital status of their parents. In California, however, the 
statute did not allow children or unwed fathers to submit re-
buttal evidence to challenge the presumption of the mother's 
husband's paternity until 1990. Thus, almost fifteen years 
after California adopted the UP A, it finally began to dismantle 
the legal constructs which explicitly preferred the mother's 
husband to the unwed father. 
A. THE COMMON LAw AND ILLEGITIMACY 
At common law, the presumption of a husband's paternity 
was intended to protect children from the stigma of illegitima-
cy and to promote marital peace and happiness. 19 A child born 
out of wedlock was known as nullius filius, literally "no one's 
son".20 An illegitimate child was denied virtually all legal 
rights to inheritance. 21 The parents had no legal relationship 
with the child, but were nonetheless obligated to support the 
child.22 
18. See Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy; The Legacy 
of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TuL. L. REV. 585, 636 (1991). On the inappropri-
ateness of the presumption in paternity determinations, Professor Kisthardt stated: 
"A conclusive marital presumption highlights form over substance and does not 
take into account the relationships that may be 'familial' but which do not consti-
tute a 'unitary family'." [d. 
19. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. at 125 citing J. Schouler, LAw OF Do-
MESTIC RELATIONS § 225 at 306 (3d ed. 1882). 
20. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *458 (1803). 
21. [d. "The rights [of the bastard] are very few, being only such as he can 
acquire; for he can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of nobody, and 
sometimes called filius nullius, sometimes, filius populi.(footnotes omitted)" [d. at 
*458-459. 
22. Diane C. Wilson, The Uniform Parentage Act; What it Will Mean for the 
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A child born to a married couple was presumed to be legit-
imate.23 The presumption was intended to ensure that a child 
born to a married woman was not denied legitimate status.24 
In some jurisdictions, the presumption of legitimacy could be 
rebutted only by the mother or her husband.25 Either party 
would have to show that the husband did not have access to 
the wife at the approximate time of conception.26 According to 
Lord Mansfield's rule, followed in other jurisdictions, neither 
the mother nor her husband were even allowed to rebut the 
presumption.27 
California codified the common law conclusive presump-
tion of paternity in 1872, which stated that the child of a wom-
an who was living with her husband at the time of conception 
is conclusively presumed to be the husband's child.28 Original-
ly, the statute provided only two narrow exceptions to rebut 
the conclusive presumption: a showing of impotencl9 or ste-
rility.30 
B. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT HAD LIMITED EFFECT ON 
THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY 
In the 1960's and 70's, the rights of unwed fathers and 
children of unwed parents began to expand.31 Many statutes 
that discriminated against children of unwed parents were 
ruled unconstitutiona1.32 In 1975, because these decisions left 
Putative Father in California. n 28 HAsT. L.J. 191, 192 (1976). 
23. BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *446. 
24. HARRy D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAw AND SOCIAL POLICY 16-17 (1971). 
25. Id. at 119. 
26. BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *457. 
27. Kisthardt, supra note 18, at 589. 
28. Wilson, supra note 22, at 199, 201. 
29. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1954)(current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 
7540 (West 1994)). 
30. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1976)(current version at CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 7540 (West 1994». 
31. Wilson, supra note 22, at 193. 
32. Harry D. Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1, 6-8 (1974) 
citing as examples Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) 
(The Court held that children of unwed parents are entitled to workmen's compen-
sation benefits related to the father's death.); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 
588 (D. Conn. 1972) (The court enjoined a Social Security provision that favored 
legitimate children when disbursing family awards.); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
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a "statutory void" in this area of the law, the Uniform Parent-
age Act (hereinafter "UPA") was drafted.33 The UPA eliminat-
ed the legal distinction between illegitimate and legitimate 
children.34 
The UPA35 was created in order to give children equal 
legal status regardless of their parents' marital status.36 In 
place of the legitimacy language, the UPA substituted the 
"parent-child relationship," intending to shift the legal focus 
from the parents' marital status to the child's familial relation-
ships.3? California continued to prefer the married parent to 
the single parent, however, by retaining the conclusive pre-
sumption of paternity after it adopted the Uniform Parentage 
Act in 1976. 
Although the unwed father could fall under one of the five 
rebuttable presumptions used to establish fatherhood,38 he 
still could not use that presumptive status to assert his pater-
nity if the mother was married to and living with another 
man. Not until 1990, after the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D.39, did the California legis-
lature expand the class of parties who could rebut the conclu-
sive presumption to include an unwed, presumed father under 
Family Code section 7611.40 
645 (1972) (The Court struck down a statute as unconstitutional which denied an 
unwed father a hearing on his fitness as a parent before removing his children 
after the mother's death.). 
33. Harry D. Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. at 7 (1974); 
Unif. Parentage Act, 9B U.LA 295 (West 1987 and Supp. 1995). 
34. Review of Selected 1975 California Legislation: "Domestic Relations; Parent 
and Child Relationship. n 7 PAC. L.J. 411 (1976). 
35. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7750 (West 1994); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B 
U.LA 295 (West 1987 and Supp. 1995). 
36. Review of Selected 1975 California Legislation: "Domestic Relations; Parent 
and child relationship. n 7 PAC. L.J. 411 (1976). "The major purpose of the UPA is 
to provide for substantive legal equality of children regardless of the marital sta-
tus of their parents." [d. at 411. 
37. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. at 296. Section 2 provides: 
"The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to 
every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." [d. California's cur-
rent version of this section is codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7602 (West 1994). 
38. CAL. CN. CODE § 7004(a) (1992), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 
(West 1994). 
39. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
40. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1990), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 
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C. THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY Is 
CONSTITUTIONAL: MICHAEL H. v. GERALD D.41 
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the United States Supreme 
Court upheld California's conclusive presumption of paterni-
ty.42 In Michael H., an unwed father attacked section 7540 on 
due process grounds in an effort to maintain his relationship 
with his biological daughter.43 The Court held that in the in-
terest of family integrity, when a mother is married to another 
man, the unwed father cannot rebut the presumption that the 
husband is the father.44 This approach failed to give weight to 
whether the unwed father was the natural father or whether 
he had a developed relationship with his child.45 
Carole D. and Gerald D. were married in 1976, later set-
tling in southern California.46 During the summer of 1978, 
Carole D. began an extramarital affair with Michael H., and in 
September 1980, Carole D. conceived a child.47 Her husband, 
Gerald D., was named as the father on the birth certificate, 
and held the child out as his own.4B Mter the child's birth 
however, Carole D. informed Michael H. that he was the 
child's biological father.49 
In October 1981, several months after the child's birth, the 
husband moved to New York, and Carole D. remained in Cali-
fornia.50 During this period of separation, Carole D. and the 
child spent time with Michael H., the natural father, who held 
(West 1994). 
41. 491 U.S. 110 (1989), 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 2 Dist. 1987), 485 
U.S. 903, cert. granted, (U.S. Feb. 29, 1988)(No. 87-746), affd, 491 U.S. 110 
(1989)(5-4 decision)(Scalia, J. wrote the plurality opinion in which Rehnquist, C.J. 
joined; O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ. joined the plurality opinion in part; Stevens, J. 
concurred in the judgment; and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White, JJ. 
dissented). 
42. ld. at 110. 
43. ld. at 129. 
44. ld. at 120. 
45. ld. at 121, 127. 
46. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113. 
47. ld. at 113. 
48. ld. at 113-14. 
49. ld. at 114. The blood test results determined natural father's paternity 
with a 98.07% probability. ld. 
50. ld. 
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the child out as his own. 51 From January to March 1982, the 
threesome lived together until the mother moved in with a 
third man, during which time she continued to visit her hus-
band in New York. 52 
In November 1982, when the mother refused to allow the 
natural father to visit the child, the father filed a filiation 
action in California Superior Court in order to establish his 
paternity and to obtain visitation rights.53 While contesting 
this action in the spring of 1983, the mother returned to her 
husband in New York.54 
At the end of the summer of 1983, Carole D. reconciled 
with Michael H. and dropped her summary judgment mo-
tion.55 For the next eight months, Michael H. again lived with 
Carole D. and their daughter in a family arrangement. 56 In 
April 1984, the mother and Michael H. drew up a stipulation 
to his paternity. 57 Then, in June 1984, the mother reconciled 
once again with her husband, and ordered her attorneys not to 
file the stipulation.58 
In October of 1984, the husband intervened in the suit, 
and filed a summary judgment motion asserting the conclusive 
presumption of his paternity.59 The trial court found that the 
mother and her husband were married and cohabiting at the 
time of the child's conception.60 Under section 7540, the ele-
ments of the presumption were fulfilled, and the court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the husband's presumed paternity.61 
51. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114. 
52. [d. 
53. [d. A filiation action is defined as "[a] special statutory proceeding in the 
nature of a civil action to enforce a civil obligation or duty specifically for the 
purpose of establishing parentage and the putative father's duty to support his 
illegitimate child." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 434 (6th ed. 1991). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114. 
57. Id. 
58. [d. at 115. 
59. [d. 
60. [d. The court relied on affidavits attesting that husband and mother were 
cohabiting at conception and that husband is neither impotent nor sterile. Id. 
61. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115. 
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Having been denied standing to rebut the application of 
the conclusive presumption of the husband's paternity, on 
appeal the natural father argued that the conclusive presump-
tion violated both his procedural and substantive due process 
rights under the United States Constitution,62 and was there-
fore unconstitutiona1.63 The California Court of Appeal reject-
ed the due process arguments and affirmed the lower court's 
decision to apply the conclusive presumption.64 The California 
Supreme Court denied discretionary review,65 but the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of the 
conclusive presumption's constitutionality.66 
In a plurality opinion written by Justice Scalia,67 the 
Court denied constitutional protection to the relationship be-
tween the unwed father and his daughter.68 The plurality fo-
cused primarily on the substantive due process argument.69 
The natural father asserted that the integrity of the mother's 
marriage was not a sufficient state interest to support termina-
tion of his relationship with his child.70 The plurality respond-
ed that the success of such an argument required that the 
relationship be a traditionally constitutionally protected liberty 
interest. 71 The Court refused to expand the definition of the 
unitary family to include the mother's lover because such a 
relationship does not fit the mold of "traditionally respected 
relationships" for purposes of constitutional protection.72 With 
[d. 
62. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XN, § 1. 
63. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116. 
64. 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 2 Dist. 1987). 
65. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116. 
66. [d. at 110. 
67. [d. 
68. [d. at 113. 
69. [d. at 121. 
70. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. at 123 n.3. 
The family unit accorded traditional respect in our soci-
ety, which we have referred to as the 'unitary family,' is 
typified, of course, by the marital family . . . Perhaps, it 
can be expanded beyond this, but it will bear no resem-
blance to traditionally respected relationships - and will 
thus cease to have any constitutional significance - if it is 
stretched so far as to include the relationship established 
between a married woman, her lover, and their child. 
9
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continued deference to the California legislature,73 and adher-
ence to a strict reading of the Constitution,74 the Court re-
fused to recognize an unwed father's liberty interest in his 
parental relationships when it conflicted with an established 
marital family unit.75 
The Court defended the statute on policy grounds. 76 
Throughout the opinion, it maintained that the primary policy 
consideration underlying the conclusive presumption was the 
integrity of the marital family.77 The Court assumed for pur-
poses of this argument that this family unit, by virtue of the 
sanctity of the unitary family arrangement, was a solid and 
nurturing one.7S In doing so, the Court ignored the inconsis-
tent and unstable nature of the mother's three relationships 
over the first three years of the child's life.79 Because the cou-
ple had decided to raise the child, the Court invoked society's 
preference for the traditional family unit, as it is manifested in 
the statute. so So, rather than assess the importance of the 
child's relationship with her father, the Court relied on tradi-
tional notions of the nuclear family to terminate the natural 
father's established relationship with the child.sl 
In response to this argument, the natural father argued 
that a prior line of Supreme Court cases granted him a liberty 
73. Id. at 122 citing to Justice White's dissent in Moore v. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 544 (1977). 
74. Id. at 122 citing again to Justice White's dissent in Moore, 431 U.S. at 
544. 
75. Michael B., 491 U.S. at 129-130. 
76. ld. at 129-130. 
77. Id. at 120. "Of course the conclusive presumption not only expresses the 
state's substantive policy but also furthers it, excluding inquiries into the child's 
paternity that would be destructive of family integrity and privacy." Id. 
78. Id. at 123. This characterization of this family directly contradicts Justice 
Scalia's prior reference to the child's various living arrangements as "quasifamily 
units". Id. at 114. 
79. Id. at 113, 114. 
80. Michael B., 491 U.S. at 129 n.7 . "That tradition [to prefer the unitary 
family to the unwed father] reflects a 'balancing' that has already been made by 
society itself." Id. 
81. See Kisthardt, supra note 18, at 633 (1991). Professor Kisthardt stated: 
"The plurality bases much of its decision on the value of protecting the 'morally 
correct' intact family. The Court refers to legislative intent and public policy, but 
in a manner that limits the discussion to a narrow view of the type of family that 
is morally acceptable to the current Court." Id. 
10
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interest in his established parental relationships.82 By nar-
rowly defining the interest at stake as that of an "adulterous 
natural father," the Court concluded that historically the natu-
ral father had never been afforded constitutional protection in 
such circumstances.83 The Court distinguished the prior cases 
because there was no existing family unit at stake.84 The 
Court further held that, though some jurisdictions had granted 
biological fathers standing, there were no cases in which the 
natural father had been given full parental or substantive 
rights in the face of an existing family unit.85 The Court held 
that there is no justification for the natural father's liberty 
interest due to the lack of precedent protecting the unwed 
father in these circumstances,86 coupled with society's tradi-
tional views toward the marital institution.87 
Finally, the Court concluded that even if the natural fa-
ther had established a relationship with the child which placed 
him on equal footing with the husband,88 society's views to-
ward marriage, as reflected in the legislation itself, tipped the 
balance in the husband's favor.89 The Court refused to estab-
lish rights of dual fatherhood.90 According to the Court, the 
82. Michael H., 491 u.s. at 123. For United States Supreme Court cases 
which have recognized rights of the unwed father based on an established parent-
child relationship see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Moham-
med, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
83. [d. at 129 n.7. 
84. [d. at 123. "As we view [these cases], they rest not upon such isolated 
factors but upon the historic respect - indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a 
term - traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary 
family." Id. But cf. [d. at 157-158 wherein Justice White states: "Prior cases here 
have recognized the liberty interest of a father in his relationship with his child." 
[d. 
85. [d. at 127. 
86. [d. at 125. 
87. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124. 
Thus, the legal issue in the present case reduces to 
whether the relationship between persons in the situation 
of the natural father and his child has been treated as a 
protected family unit under the historic practices of our 
society, or whether on any other basis it has been accord-
ed special protection. 
88. See supra note 78. 
89. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 119. 
90. [d. at 118. Justice Scalia relied on the observation that California law does 
not provide for dual fatherhood. 
11
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natural father's opportunity to develop the parental relation-
ship conflicted with the husband's opportunity to do the 
same.91 Therefore, because the court considered marriage a 
priority, the husband's opportunity preempted the unwed 
father's relationship.92 Despite the questionable stability of 
the marriage itself, the plurality protected the ideal of the 
unitary family at the expense of the established relationship 
between the unwed father and the child. 
In dissenting opinions, Justices Brennan and White took 
issue with the plurality's assertion that unwed fathers do not 
have a constitutionally protected interest when the mother is 
married to someone else.93 Essentially, the plurality ruled 
that the unwed father has no rights in such circumstances 
because the state has an interest in protecting the integrity of 
the family unit.94 
Justice Brennan contended that the plurality's reliance on 
tradition as a source of protected liberty interests provided less 
guidance in practice than the plurality claimed.95 He argued 
that California's conclusive presumption of paternity was origi-
nally intended to protect children from the stigma of illegitima-
cy when accurate determination of biological paternity was 
impossible.96 With the advent of blood tests and DNA match-
ing, the only remaining justification for the presumption would 
91. [d. at 129. "Where, however, the child is born into an extant marital fami-
ly, the natural father's unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique op-
portunity of the husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the 
State to give categorical preference to the latter." [d. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. at 136, 157. 
94. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 154. 
95. [d. at 137. "Because reasonable people can disagree about the content of 
particular traditions, and because they can disagree even about which traditions 
are relevant to the definition of 'liberty', the plurality has not found the objective 
boundary that it seeks." [d. 
[d. 
96. [d. at 140. 
In the plurality's constitutional universe, we may not take 
notice of the fact that the original reasons for the conclu-
sive presumption of paternity are out of place in a world 
in which blood tests can prove virtually beyond a shadow 
of a doubt who sired a particular child and in which the 
fact of illegitimacy no longer plays the burdensome and 
stigmatizing role it once did. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss2/4
1996] PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY 349 
be the state's interest in the family unit.97 The dissenters ar-
gued that the plurality erroneously allowed the state's interest 
to determine the existence of the liberty interest in question 
and adamantly disputed the plurality's narrow focus on 
society's traditional reverence for the marital family.98 
Both Justices Brennan and White pointed out that had the 
Court taken a similar traditional tack in a line of its prior 
relevant cases, those decisions would have had drastically 
different results.99 They also asserted that an unwed father's 
interest in his substantial parent-child relationship is not a 
newly recognized interest and that the plurality was mistaken 
in this regard. 100 
The plurality opinion was widely criticized101 as a depar-
ture from that line of Supreme Court cases102 which expand-
ed the unwed father's rights on both Due Process and Equal 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 145. 
99. Michael B., 491 U.S. at 139, 157. 
100. Id. at 142-43, 157. Justice Brennan stated: 
On four prior occasions, we have considered whether un-
wed fathers have a constitutionally protected interest in 
their relationships with their children. See Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 
246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 
(1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). Though 
different in factual and legal circumstances, these cases 
have produced a unifying theme: although an unwed 
father's biological link to his child does not, in and of 
itself, guarantee him a constitutional stake in his relation-
ship with that child, such a link combined with a sub-
stantial parent-child relationship will do so. 
Id. at 142-43. 
101. E.g. Michael B., 491 U.S. at 135 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 157 
(White, J., dissenting); Kisthardt, supra note 18, at 585; Joan C. Sylvain, Note, 
Michael B. v. Gerald D.: The Presumption of Paternity, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 831 
(1990); Traci Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Rela-
tionship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1988); Jill Handley Anderson, The Function-
ing Father: A Unified Approach to Paternity Determinations, 30 J. FAM. L. 847 
(1991); Elizabeth A. Hadad, Comment, Tradition and the Liberty Interest: Circum-
scribing the Rights of the Natural Father: Michael B. v. Gerald D. 56 BROOKLYN 
L. REV. 291 (1990). 
102. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 
246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 
U.S. 248 (1983). 
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Protection grounds. 103 These critics argued that earlier cases 
recognized the importance of the established parent-child rela-
tionship when determining paternity. They also noted that the 
plurality's reliance on the notion of the unitary family ignored 
the realities of most modern American family circumstanc-
es. 1M 
D. THE RESPONSE To MICHAEL H. V. GERALD D.: THE 1990 
AMENDMENT To THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION - FAMILY 
CODE SECTION 7611(D) 
Mter Michael H., 105 the California Legislature amended 
the conclusive presumption of section 7540 to allow the pre-
sumed father and the child to rebut the presumption with 
blood test evidence. lOG Under this section, a man is presumed 
to be a child's father if he fulfills the criteria of one of the five 
rebuttable presumptions adopted from the Uniform Parentage 
Act,to7 known in California as Family Code section 7611.108 
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1. 
104. See, e.g., Kisthardt, supra note 18, at 627. 
105. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
106. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541 (West 1994). Section 7541 provides in relevant 
part: 
Id. 
(a) Notwithstanding Section 7540, if the court finds 
that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the 
evidence based on blood tests performed pursuant to 
Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7550), are that the 
husband is not the father of the child, the question of 
paternity of the husband shall be resolved accordingly. 
(b) The notice of motion for blood tests under this 
section may be filed not later than two years from the 
child's date of birth by the husband, or for the purposes 
of establishing paternity by the presumed father or the 
child through or by the child's guardian ad litem. AI:, used 
in this subdivision, "presumed father" has the meaning 
given in Sections 7611 and 7612. 
107. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a), 9B U.LA 295, 298-99 (West 1987). 
108. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 1994 and Supp. 1996). Section 7611 pro-
vides: 
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a 
child if he meets the conditions provided in Chapter 1 
(commencing with Section 7540) or Chapter 3 (commenc-
ing with Section 7570) of Part 2 or in any of the follow-
ing subdivisions: 
(a) He and the child's natural mother are or have 
14
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Relevant here are the presumptions which provide that a man 
is presumed to be the child's father under this section if he and 
the mother are married at the time of birth; if the child is born 
within 300 days of the termination of the marriage; if the cou-
ple has attempted to marry before or after the child's birth; or 
if the man receives the child into his home and openly holds 
out the child as his own. 109 California courts have also placed 
natural fathers and husbands on equal footing under these 
rebuttable presumptions in order to assess the family circum-
stances, without being bound by the conclusive presump-
[d. 
109. [d. 
been married to each other and the child is born during 
the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is 
terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, 
or divorce, or after a judgment of separation is entered by 
a court. 
(b) Before the child's birth, he and the child's natu-
ral mother have attempted to marry each other by a 
marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law, 
although the attempted marriage is or could be declared 
invalid, and either of the following is true: 
(1) If the attempted marriage could be declared 
invalid only by a court, the child is born during the at-
tempted marriage, or within 300 days after its termina-
tion by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or 
divorce. 
(2) If the attempted marriage is invalid without a 
court order the child is born within 300 days after the 
termination of cohabitation. 
(c) After the child's birth, he and the child's natural 
mother have married, or attempted to marry, each other 
by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with 
law, although the attempted marriage is or could be de-
clared invalid, and either of the following is true: 
(1) With his consent, he is named as the child's 
father on the child's birth certificate. 
(2) He is obligated to support the child under a 
written voluntary promise or by court order. 
(d) He receives the child into his home and openly 
holds out the child as his natural child. 
(e) If the child was born and resides in a nation 
with which the United States engages in an Orderly De-
parture Program or successor program, he acknowledges 
that he is the child's father in a declaration under penal-
ty of peIjury, as specified in Section 2015.5 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. This subdivision shall remain in effect 
only until January 1, 1997, and on that date shall become 
inoperative. 
15
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tion. llO This expansion boded well for unwed fathers who had 
an established relationship with the child whose mother was 
married to another man. III 
Given its vague language and limited applicability, section 
7611(d), which states that a man is presumed to be a child's 
father if he receives the child into his home, was criticized as 
an inadequate remedy for the unwed father's dwindling legal 
status.1l2 Prior to this statutory revision however, only the 
mother or her husband were permitted to admit rebuttal evi-
dence, 113 and unwed fathers were limited to attacking the 
constitutionality of the statute.1l4 Now, the unwed father 
may establish himself as a presumed father under section 
7611(d).1l5 He may then directly dispute the conclusive pre-
sumption as an acknowledged, interested party by demonstrat-
ing that he has "openly held the child out as his own and has 
received the child into his home.,,1l6 This revision reflects the 
reasoning of the earlier Supreme Court holdings that a father 
and child have a constitutionally protected interest in protect-
ing and maintaining their relationship.ll7 
110. See supra part N.B for relevant discussion of Steven W. v. Matthew S., 39 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (1995). 
111. These rebuttable presumptions previously pertained to unwed fathers who 
wanted to stay adoption proceedings. In re Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216 
(1992). A father who wants the right to consent to his child's adoption first must 
establish his status as a presumed father under one the five presumptions. CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 7017 (1990), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7660 (West 1994). 
This amendment is likely due in large part to the lobbying efforts of Mi-
chael H. after Justice Scalia took his daughter away. Marcia Coyle, After the Gav-
el Comes Down, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 25, 1991, at l. 
112. See Halpern, supra note 7, at 305. Halpern contends that the definition of 
a "presumed father" under this subsection subjects the father to the "whims of the 
child's mother". Arguably, the mother may intentionally prevent the father from 
seeing the child and in that way keep the father from meeting any relationship 
standard. Id. at 307. 
113. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1981)(current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 
7540 (West 1994». 
114. E.g., In re Lisa R. 532 P.2d 123 (1975); Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 703 
P.2d 88 (1985); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
115. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 1994); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541 (West 1994); 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 1994 and Supp. 1996). 
116. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 1994 and Supp. 1996). 
117. See Kisthardt, supra note 18, at 621. Professor Kisthardt, commenting on 
Justice Brennan's dissent in Michael H., stated: "Focusing on the relationship 
between Michael and Victoria, he [Brennan] concluded that previous Court hold-
ings are clear; a biological link plus an established relationship gives rise to a 
16
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III. POST-MICHAEL H. CALIFORNIA CASE LAW: 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE UNWED FATHER-
CHILD RELATIONSHIP BEFORE THE 1990 
AMENDMENT 
Within a year after the United States Supreme Court 
decided Michael H. v. Gerald D., 118 two California Courts of 
Appeal refused to apply the conclusive presumption of paterni-
ty.119 Though the Michael H. Court had just upheld the con-
stitutionality of the presumption, these two courts granted 
paternity to the natural father. Because the statute did not 
provide any meaningful exceptions to the conclusive presump-
tion and the Legislature had yet to amend the UP A, the courts 
devised ways around it in order to grant paternity to the man 
with the established relationship.120 The court decided In re 
Guardianship of Ethan S. based on the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel,121 while the court in In re Melissa G. refused to ap-
ply the presumption on constitutional grounds. 122 Such case 
law laid the foundation for statutory change in favor of the 
unwed father who has a relationship with his child despite the 
mother's marriage to another man. 
A. IN RE MELISSA G. 123 
In In re Melissa G., a married woman gave birth to Melis-
sa, whom she conceived with a man who was not her hus-
band.124 Eight days after the birth, the married couple sepa-
rated. 125 The husband was named as the father on the birth 
certificate, and the child was named as a child of the marriage 
at dissolution. 126 After the dissolution, the ex-husband visited 
protected liberty interest." Id. at 621. 
118. 490 U.S. 110 (1989). 
119. In re Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 6 Dist. 1989); In re 
Guardianship of Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1990). 
120. See supra notes 121-22. 
121. Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 129. 
122. Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. at 894. 
123. In re Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 6 Dist. 1989). 
124. Id. at 895. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
17
Smernoff: Presumption of Paternity
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
354 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:337 
the other children of the marriage but not Melissa. 127 
For four years, the mother was married to the natural 
father with whom she and the children lived as a family and 
during that time had another child with him.12s When the 
mother was hospitalized for alcohol abuse and the child's natu-
ral father was arrested for spousal abuse, the children were 
taken into protective custody. 129 The older children of the 
first marriage were placed with their father, the ex-hus-
band. 130 Melissa and a younger child of the second marriage 
were placed together in a foster home. 131 
The ex-husband of the mother's first marriage sought to 
assert the conclusive presumption of his paternity in order to 
obtain custody of Melissa. 132 The trial court disregarded the 
blood tests that confirmed the second husband's biological 
fatherhood, 133 and ruled in favor of the ex-husband.134 The 
court found a conclusive presumption under section 7540 and 
held that the first husband was the child's father as a matter 
of law. 135 
The California Court of Appeal overturned the trial court's 
application of the presumption of paternity.13G The court re-
lied in part on Michael H., which recognized a natural father's 
constitutionally protected interest in a situation where no 
marital union existed at the time of disposition.137 Here, be-
127. [d. 
128. Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. at 895. 
129. [d. 
130. [d. 
13l. [d. 
132. [d. 
133. Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. at 895. The blood test results showed 99.1 per-
cent probability that the second husband was the child's father. [d. 
134. [d. The first husband contended that application of the conclusive presump-
tion precluded consideration of rebuttal evidence such as the blood test results. [d. 
135. [d. The trial court based its reasoning on Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 703 
P.2d 88 (1985), and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), finding that 
because the mother and husband were married and cohabiting at the time of con-
ception, they were presumptively the parents of the child. [d. 
136. [d. at 898. The Court of Appeal found that the underlying purpose of the 
statute would not be served by depriving the child of her relationship with her 
sister in order to place her with a father she with whom she has no relationship. 
[d. 
137. [d. at 897. "The Supreme Court's affirmance in Michael H. was limited to 
18
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cause the initial family unit no longer existed and only lasted 
eight days after the child's conception, the state had no inter-
est in protecting it.138 The Melissa G. court also found that 
the first husband had not established any substantial relation-
ship with the child. 139 Societal interests were better served 
because the natural father had assumed the primary paternal 
role for the four years of the child's life. 140 
By focusing on a prior line of similar cases preceding Mi-
chael H., the Melissa G. court found that precedent protected 
fathers who had actively established substantial relationships 
with their children and voluntarily provided emotional and 
financial support. 141 The Melissa G. court applied the hold-
ings which emphasized the importance of protecting and en-
couraging substantial relationships whether it be the 
husband's or the unwed father's relationship.142 
The Melissa G. court employed a balancing of interests to 
decide whether to remove the child from the foster home where 
she was placed with her closest family relation, her sister.143 
Because there was no marital union to protect and both estab-
lished familial relationships were outside the non-existent 
marriage, the facts weighed against applying the conclusive 
presumption.144 The Melissa G. court held that the state and 
private interests in protecting the child's relationships con-
situations in which the husband and wife wish to raise the wife's child jointly; 
Justice Scalia explicitly left open the possibility that a constitutionally protected 
interest might be implicated where no such union exists. (citation omitted)" Id. 
See, Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129 n.7. 
138. Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. at 898. The court compared the extant marriage 
in Michael H. with this case where the marriage dissolved eight days after the 
child's birth and concluded: "[t]he 'categorical preference' for an extant marital 
union which Justice Scalia recognized as being expressed by the statute thus has 
no application to this case." Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 895-97. The court compared the facts of the case at bar to the fol-
lowing contextually similar cases: In re Lisa R., 532 P.2d 123 (1975); Estate of 
Cornelius, 674 P.2d 245 (1984); Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 703 P.2d 88 (1985); 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 
(1989). 
142. 261 Cal. Rptr. at 898. 
143. Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. at 896, relying on In re Lisa R., 532 P.2d 123 
(1975). 
144. Id. at 898. 
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trolled. 145 The underlying purpose of the presumption would 
not be served by presuming the first husband to be the father, 
even though the older children already lived with him and the 
natural father was in prison, because that would deprive the 
child of her most substantial relationship.l46 
The Melissa G. court looked beyond the mother's marriage 
at the time of conception, and gave more weight to the estab-
lished parent-child relationship between Melissa and her natu-
ral father. 147 The court refused to create family relationships 
for abstract legal purposes,l48 though it had protected parties' 
private interests in preserving established family relation-
ships.149 As unwed fathers in California fought against the 
conclusive presumption of the husband's paternity for their 
parental rights, Melissa G. was a step toward satisfaction for 
those fathers who have a relationship warranting special pro-
tection from the law. 
B. IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF ETHAN S.150 
In In re Ethan S., the mother conceived her child during a 
weekend extramarital encounter.l5l Wayne, the natural fa-
ther was always known by the child to be the father;152 the 
child called him "dad" and called his mother's husband by his 
first name. 153 When the mother divorced her husband, she 
moved to Australia and left the child in California.154 The 
child lived with the ex-husband, during which time Wayne 
145. [d. 
146. [d. 
147. [d. at 898. The court found a way around the presumption using the Mi-
chael H. opinion, which stated that the classification and the policy it serves must 
fit in order to apply the presumption. [d. 
148. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979). The United States Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held the view that "[pjarental rights do not spring 
full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They require 
relationships more enduring." [d. 
149. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
150. 271 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1990). 
151. [d. at 123. 
152. [d. 
153. [d. 
154. [d. 
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maintained consistent contact, and the ex-husband represented 
that Wayne was the child's father. 155 
Four years later, the child moved in with Wayne, the natu-
ral father, attended elementary school, and began to develop a 
strong bond with Wayne and the paternal grandparents. 156 
During this time, Wayne established himself as the child's 
legal guardian. 157 After the ex-husband attempted to abduct 
the child from his classroom, the natural father sought sole 
custody of the child.15s In his answer to the natural father's 
custody action, the ex-husband asserted the conclusive pre-
sumption of his own paternity on the grounds that he and the 
child's mother were married and cohabiting at the time of the 
child's conception.159 Upon a recommendation from the child's 
psychotherapist, 160 the lower court denied the ex-husband 
any parental rights and granted the natural father and the 
grandparents joint custody.161 
The California Court of Appeal refused to apply the con-
clusive presumption of section 7540 and affirmed the lower 
court's grant of summary judgment for the natural father. 162 
Rather than decide the case on constitutional grounds, the 
Ethan S. court based its decision on equitable estoppel. 163 It 
held that because the ex-husband permitted and encouraged 
the natural father to establish a relationship with the child 
and neglected to do so himself in any meaningful way, he was 
155. Ethan S.,· 271 Cal. Rptr. at 123. 
156. [d. at 124. 
157. [d. 
158. [d. 
159. [d. 
160. Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 125. Ethan's psychotherapist found that he had 
formed strong bonds both with his natural father and his grandparents. He did 
not believe that his mother's ex-husband was his father and resented that the ex-
husband's attempts to intrude on his life with his father's family. [d. 
161. [d. at 125, 126. The court concluded that the child's best interests would 
be served with fewer disruptions in his home life. [d. at 125. 
162. [d. at 129. 
163. [d. California Evidence Code section 623 states: "Whenever a party has, 
by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to 
believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any liti-
gation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it." [d. 
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estopped from asserting rights under the conclusive presump-
tion of section 7540. 164 
During the time that the child lived with the natural fa-
ther, he formed substantial bonds with the natural father and 
his parents. 165 The child understood that the natural father 
was his true father and that his half siblings were the ex-
husband's children. 166 The ex-husband had never asserted his 
paternity and had expressly acquiesced to the natural father's 
paternity.167 The ex-husband told the child that the natural 
father was his father, and so, he was estopped from claiming 
otherwise. 16B 
By estopping the husband from asserting his paternity, the 
Ethan S. court effectively protected the existing father-child 
relationship, making certain that the child's life would not be 
disrupted any further. The Ethan S. court recognized that 
preserving the developed parent-child relationship was best for 
the child and paramount to any outside claims.169 In order to 
fulfill the underlying purpose of the conclusive presumption, 
the Ethan S. court refused to apply section 7540.170 This deci-
sion represents a continuing trend in the California courts to 
set aside the conclusive presumption of paternity when enforc-
ing the presumption displaces a child's established relationship 
with her father.17l 
164. [d. at 129. 
165. Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 130. The court states: "Ethan relied on that 
representation, building a life-long relationship with Wayne [the natural father) as 
his natural father and living with Wayne on that understanding, developing par-
ent-like attachments with the 'grandparents' who stepped in when the ailing 
Wayne tragically died." [d. 
166. [d. 
167. [d. "[W)e see no reason why estoppel should not apply in the more unusu-
al case, as here, where the man tells the child he is not the father and that an-
other man is." [d. 
168. [d. 
169. [d. 
170. Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 130. "In this case, there is no policy risk that 
applying the doctrine [of estoppel) will leave the child fatherless or unsupported. 
Also, if we view the cases cited above as justified by the policy of preserving ex-
isting father-child relationships, the same policy is served by an estoppel here." [d. 
171. See supra parts III-IV for complete discussion. 
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IV. CALIFORNIA CASE LAW SINCE THE 1990 
AMENDMENT: THE UNWED FATHER'S 
OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT THE CONCLUSIVE 
PRESUMPTION OF THE HUSBAND'S PATERNITY 
Two recent California Court of Appeal decisions, Comino v. 
Kelly 172 and Steven W. v. Matthew S.,173 represent a signifi-
cant change in the unwed father's ability to challenge the con-
clusive presumption of paternity. These courts granted the 
unwed fathers paternity not because application of the statute 
under certain conditions was unconstitutional, but because the 
newly-enacted father-child relationship exception to section 
7540 allows the unwed father to challenge the husband direct-
ly.174 Once the unwed father was able to demonstrate that he 
indeed had a meaningful relationship with the child, the courts 
did not automatically favor the husband. 175 Rather, the courts 
treated the husband's presumed paternity as a rebuttable 
presumption, placing the unwed father on comparable foot-
ing.176 In effect, the father-child relationship, rather than the 
marital situation of the mother, became the primary factor in 
the paternity determination. 
A. COMINO V. KELLy177 
In Comino v. Kelly, the mother and an acquaintance mar-
ried in order to take advantage of military benefits which were 
only available to married couples. 178 Aside from their marital 
status, the two were essentially roommates and never engaged 
in any sexual relations. 179 During the marriage, the mother 
had a sexual relationship with another man, Paul, and became 
pregnant. 180 The mother then moved in with Paul, and for 
two and a half years Paul assumed the role of the child's fa-
172. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 4 Dist. 1994). 
173. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1995). 
174. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 728; 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 535. 
175. [d. 
176. [d. 
177. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 4 Dist. 1994). 
178. [d. at 729. 
179. [d. 
180. [d. 
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ther.18l When the mother moved back in with her husband 
and threatened to restrict Paul's visitation, Paul initiated a 
paternity action to establish his custodial rights. 182 He was 
granted temporary joint legal and physical custody, with physi-
cal custody 50 percent of the time. 183 
On appeal, the mother attempted to prevent the father 
from seeing his child by arguing that the court erred in not 
applying the conclusive presumption of paternity in favor of 
her husband. l84 She maintained that she and her husband 
were cohabiting at the time of conception and therefore, pursu-
ant to section 7540, her husband was the presumed father.185 
She also argued that Paul was estopped from establishing his 
paternity because "he failed to carry his burden of establishing 
a biological link with [the child].,,186 The husband joined the 
paternity suit, however, to deny any relationship with the 
child, legal or otherwise, and thus, clarified that the natural 
father was the appropriate choice.187 
1. The Conclusive Presumption Of The Husband's Paternity 
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's 
refusal to apply the conclusive presumption of paternity to a 
situation where the marriage was "one in name only, ... 
[where the child] never lived in a family unit with [his mother 
and her husband],,,188 and where the unwed father held out 
the child as his own and received the child into his home for 
the child's entire life. 189 
The Comino court relied on an earlier California case190 
which held that the courts "have refused to apply [the conclu-
181. [d. at 730. 
182. Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730. 
183. [d. 
184. [d. 
185. [d. 
186. [d. 
187. Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730. 
188. [d. at 731. 
189. [d. 
190. County of Orange v. Leslie B., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797 (Cal. Ct. App. 4 Dist. 
1993). 
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sive presumption of former section 621] when the underlying 
policies are not furthered."191 When deciding whether or not 
to apply the conclusive presumption, the Comino court held 
that the underlying purposes of the presumption192 would not 
be furthered if the presumption were applied in this case.193 
First, the marriage was one of convenience and was there-
fore not deserving of the protection afforded by the pre sump-
tion. 194 There was no family unit to preserve and the integri-
ty of the marriage was not jeopardized.195 Second, the societal 
interest in the child having a father was furthered by the natu-
ral, active father having custody.196 The husband showed no 
interest in taking that role, and in fact denied his paternity in 
his answer to the natural father's complaint. 197 Third, the 
state's interest in securing an individual source of child sup-
port was satisfied by granting custody to the natural father 
who was fighting to take on parental responsibilities. 19B Pri-
vate and state interests in protecting the child's welfare and 
financial well-being were satisfied by the unwed father, who 
voluntarily assumed a very active role in raising the child. 199 
In Comino, the marriage resembled a business arrange-
ment more than an intimate relationship.20o To favor this 
marriage over the father-child relationship would "[lead] to an 
absurd result that defies reason and common sense. To apply 
the [presumption] is to rely upon a fiction to establish a legal 
fact which we know to be untrue, in order to protect policies 
which in this case do not exist."201 
191. Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730. 
192. [d. at 731. The court relied on Leslie B. which delineated the established 
policies underlying the presumption as follows: ''Traditionally, it was stated that 
the presumption was designed [1] to preserve the integrity of the family unit, [2] 
protect children from the legal and social stigma of illegitimacy, and [3] promote 
individual rather than state responsibility for child support." Id. 
193. Id. at 731. 
194. Id. at 729, 731. 
195. Id. at 731. 
196. Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 729. 
201. [d. 
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2. The Presumption Of The Unwed Father's Paternity 
In the second part of the holding, the Comino court further 
held that the natural father was the presumed father under 
Family Code section 7611(d),202 which provides that a man 
who receives the child into his home and openly holds the child 
out as his own is presumed to be the child's father.203 This 
decision marked the first time that a California court employed 
this rebuttable presumption since the change in the statutory 
language of the conclusive presumption.204 Now, without 
mounting a constitutional attack, this father could obtain legal 
rights to his relationship with his child. 
Upon examination of the nature, length, and quality of the 
father-child relationship, the Comino court determined that 
the relationship was substantial enough to qualify the father 
as a presumed father. 205 The Comino court found that the 
natural father deserved recognition because he had assumed 
an active and caring paternal role in the child's life for three 
years.206 This represents a significant advance from Michael 
H., where the Court denied an unwed father, who had a simi-
larly substantial relationship, any constitutional protection 
when the mother was married to and living with another 
man.207 
In Comino, despite the mother's assertion of the conclusive 
presumption, the unwed father had a right as the presumed 
father to fight for obtaining parental rights.208 The Comino 
court recognized and validated the unwed father-child relation-
ship.209 This decision laid the groundwork, using Family Code 
202. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (1992), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 
(West 1994). 
203. [d. 
204. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
205. Camino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732. 
206. [d. "[T]here was uncontradicted evidence that [the natural father] received 
[the child] into his home, lived with him, held him out as his own and supported 
him for nearly two-and-a-half years." [d. 
207. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 117. 
208. Camino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731. The court upheld the trial court's order 
that Comino "pay child support to Stephanie, and continued joint legal and physi-
cal custody." [d. 
209. [d. at 731. ''To the extent there is a recognizable societal concern for Josh-
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section 7611(d), for any future unwed father who must chal-
lenge the conclusive presumption of paternity in order to pre-
serve his father-child relationship.210 
B. STEVEN W. v. MATHEW S.211 
In Steven W. v. Matthew S., Steven W., the mother's boy-
friend was led to believe that the child was his, and held the 
child out as his own for three years.212 While they were living 
together, the mother told Steven W. that she had divorced her 
husband, Matthew S.213 Before they obtained a divorce, the 
mother and her husband conceived a child while away on a 
clandestine weekend trip.214 For three years, the mother and 
Steven W. raised the child as a child of their relationship.215 
Steven W. was named as the father on school records and the 
birth certificate, and the child was given his surname.216 
When Steven W. discovered that the mother had deceived him 
about her marital situation, he moved out and initiated a pa-
ternity suit.217 
The lower court refused to apply section 7540 even though 
the mother's boyfriend was asserting paternity, and was nei-
ther the biological father nor the mother's husband.218 In-
stead, the lower court found that both men were presumed 
fathers of the child; the husband under former Evidence Code 
section 621,219 and Steven W. under former Civil Code section 
7004(a)( 4). 220 
ua to have a father, that concern is served by avoiding the presumption that 
would prevent Joshua from enjoying a parental relationship with the only man he 
has ever known as a father." Id. 
210. See discussion supra part IV.B regarding Steven w. v. Matthew S., 39 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1995). 
211. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1995). 
212. Id. at 539. 
213. Id. at 536. 
214. Id. 
215. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536-37. The unwed father and the mother 
bought a home, lived together and cared for the child. The unwed father was 
directly involved with the child's care. Id. 
216. Id. at 537. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 539. 
219. Id. at 538; CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (1990), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 
7540 (West 1994). 
220. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539; CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (1992), 
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1. The Conclusive Presumption Of The Husband's Paternity 
On appeal, the Steven W. court held that the trial court's 
application of the conclusive presumption was based on an 
overly broad interpretation of the element of cohabiting.221 In 
California, cohabiting is strictly defined: "And by cohabitation 
is not meant simply the gratification of the sexual passion, but 
to live or dwell together, to have the same habitation, so that 
where one lives and dwells there does the other live and dwell 
also.,,222 The Steven W. court ruled that the mother's weekend 
tryst with her husband failed to fulfill this element of the pre-
sumption, and held that the trial court erred in applying the 
conclusive presumption on this basis. 223 
2. The Presumption Of The Unwed Father's Paternity 
Under California Civil Code section 7004(a)(4),224 Ste-
phen was presumed to be the child's father because he had 
received the child into his home and openly held out the child 
as his own,225 and the husband was also presumed to be the 
child's father under 7004(a)(1).226 The Steven W. court upheld 
the lower court's decision that Steven W.'s established relation-
ship was controllin!f27 regardless of the husband's presump-
tive status under the conclusive presumption.228 
California Family Code section 7612 provides that, when a 
conflict arises between the presumption of the husband's pater-
replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 1994). 
221. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538. 
222. [d. at 538 quoting Kusior v. Silver, 354 P.2d 657 (1960). 
223. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538; CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (1992), 
replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 1994). 
224. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539; CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(l) (1992), 
replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (West 1994). 
225. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539. 
226. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (1992), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 
(West 1994). 
227. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(b) (1992), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612 
(West 1994). Section 7004(b) provided in pertinent part: "If two or more presump-
tions arise under Section 7611 which conflict with each other, the presumption 
which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic 
controls." [d. 
228. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539. 
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nity and the presumption of another man's paternity, "the 
presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier 
consideration of policy and logic controls."229 The court looked 
to the established relationship as the deciding factor.23o Ste-
ven assumed the role of the child's father from the child's 
birth; he cared for the child and participated in important 
decision making regarding the child's health, education, and 
care, and was known to others as the child's father. 231 
Steven's level of parental involvement was sharply contrasted 
with the mother's husband, who did not see the child until the 
child was almost three months old.232 Steven continued to 
share custody and support responsibilities after he moved out 
and the mother was living with her husband.233 A man who 
asserts his parental rights and assumes those responsibilities 
is deemed a more deserving parent regardless of the couple's 
marital status.234 
This holding validated the trial court's finding that the 
more developed relationship was the critical consideration and 
that this relationship controlled over the husband's legal status 
as a presumed father under section 7540.235 The unwed fa-
ther was not the biological father, nor was he the mother's 
husband, yet the court granted him parental rights. 236 Here, 
the Steven W. court expanded the application of this rebuttable 
229. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(b) (1992), replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612 
(West 1994). 
230. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539. The court cited many cases in which 
the courts upheld the existing parent-child relationships on the grounds that: 
"[t]he state has an 'interest in preserving and protecting the developed parent-
child . . . relationships which give young children social and emotional strength 
and stability.'" (citation omitted) [d. See, e.g., Susan H. v. Jack S., 37 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 120 (1994); Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 703 P.2d 88 (1985); Comino v. Kelly, 30 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (1994). 
231. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539. 
232. [d. at 537. 
233. [d. 
234. [d.; See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). The Lehr Court 
held that: "[if the father] grasps the opportunity and accepts some measure of 
responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child 
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development." 
[d. at 262. 
235. Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538-39. 
236. [d. 
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presumption to a new level, because, unlike Comino, this mar-
riage was authentic. 237 
The Steven W. court concluded that "[g]iven the strong 
social policy in favor of preserving the on-going father-child 
relationship, the trial court did not err in finding that the 
conflict between the presumptions weighed in favor of Ste-
ven.,,238 The Steven W. court allowed the unwed father's pre-
sumption of paternity to preempt the presumption of the 
husband's paternity due to the weight attributed to the parent-
child relationship while balancing competing interests.239 
The Steven W. court narrowly construed the conclusive 
presumption while giving the father-child relationship greater 
weight when employing the section 7611(d) exception.240 In 
the future, men with developed parental relationships may be 
protected more often when their interests conflict with the 
mother's husband's interest in that relationship. AB evidenced 
by these cases, the competing rebuttable presumptions protect 
the stability of a child's surroundings more effectively than the 
conclusive presumption in that they consider the relationship 
between the parent and the child instead of the relationship 
between the parents. In contrast, section 7540 is based solely 
on the relationship between the parents. Thus, the applicabili-
ty of section 7540 has been undermined so as to render it vir-
tually ineffective. Therefore, it should be repealed. 
V. RECOMMENDATION 
Critics of the conclusive presumption of paternity argue 
that it jeopardizes a child's need for continuity in her parental 
relationships.241 Studies show that because a child grows at-
tached to her parents at a very young age, if deprived of that 
237. Id. at 536. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. "The courts have repeatedly held, in applying paternity presumptions, 
that the extant parent-child relationship is to be preserved at the cost of biological 
ties. Id. 
240. See supra notes 210-39 and accompanying discussion. 
241. See Jill Handley Anderson, The Functioning Father: A Unified Approach to 
Paternity Determinations, 30 J. FAM. L. 847, 863 (1991); Kisthardt, supra note 18, 
at 585. 
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relationship, the child is likely to experience problems in her 
emotional and intellectual development.242 Familial relation-
ships in these paternity determinations are of paramount im-
portance, therefore the parents' marital status should be given 
less weight.243 Unlike the conclusive presumption, a legal 
concept of "family" centered around the established parent-
child relationship would accommodate contemporary, alterna-
tive familial circumstances,244 and more effectively stabilize 
the child's home environment and her guardian relationships 
in the tumultuous setting of a custody dispute. 
Both Comino v. Kelly and Steven W. v. Matthew S. repre-
sent a continued trend in the California courts to abrogate the 
conclusive presumption of paternity.245 Now, with the addi-
tion of the exceptions in section 7611, unwed fathers who have 
established relationships with their children have an opportu-
nity to rebut the presumption of the mother's husband's pater-
nity.246 These two recent cases bolster this power to challenge 
the presumption of paternity both by acknowledging the impor-
tance of a developed parent-child relationship and by demon-
strating how the section 7611(d) rebuttable presumption can 
operate to overcome the section 7540 conclusive presump-
tion.247 The unwed father no longer needs to wage a constitu-
242. JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD chs. 
2-3 (1973) (The authors proposed that continuity in a child's relationships, environ-
ment, and surroundings is essential for the child's intellectual, emotional, physical, 
social, and moral growth. The authors emphasized how the importance of these 
elements is underestimated by adults.); RUTH S. PARRY ET AL., CUSTODY DISPUTES: 
EVALUATION AND INTERVENTION 67 (1986) (Continuity of care for the children 
found to have influenced at least 60% of all custody recommendations in control 
group.). 
243. Anderson, supra note 241, at 872. "Clinging to nostalgic notions of the 
nuclear family or rigid presumptions of parenthood based on status facilitates the 
displacement of functioning fathers, resulting in harm to children." Id. 
244. See Kisthardt, supra note 18, at 632. "First, as our society has become 
more pluralistic, it has become increasingly more difficult for law to accommodate 
diverse views about family morals. It is therefore less acceptable for the state to 
expect conformity with any particular family pattern as ideal." Id. See also, Traci 
Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 389 (1988). 
245. See, e.g., Comino v. Kelly, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1994); 
Steven W. v. Matthew S., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1995); In re 
Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 6 Dist. 1989); In re Guardianship of 
Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1990). 
246. E.g., Comino, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728; Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535. 
247. See supra part III for complete discussion. 
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tional attack to be heard on the importance of his relationship 
with his child. 
While the statutory amendments are encouraging for the 
unwed father, until the conclusive presumption is repealed, 
unwed fathers remain at an unfair, unfounded disadvantage to 
the mother's husband. Due to the changing face of the fami-
1y248 and the absence of the stigma of illegitimacy,249 
California courts are less apt to find the conclusive presump-
tion of paternity.250 Section 7540 has become a procedural 
hindrance to ensuring a child's emotional stability inasmuch as 
it still runs the risk of depriving a child of the only father he 
or she knoWS. 251 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The courts and the social scientists agree that paternity 
determinations which focus on the child's existing relationships 
more often benefit the child. In stark contrast, the conclusive 
presumption of section 7540 maintains a technical definition of 
paternity based on the outmoded assumption that any marital 
family is better than none. Contemporary families warrant 
contemporary legal standards. Thus, the conclusive presump-
tion of paternity of California Family Code section 7540 should 
be repealed. 
Batya F. Smernoff 
248. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 79 tbl. 97, 80 tbl. 101 (114th ed. 1994). In 1991, 28 percent of births in 
the nation and 33.3 percent of the births in California were to unwed mothers. Id. 
249. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7602 (West 1994). Section 7602 states: ''The parent and 
child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of 
the marital status of the parents." Id. 
250. See, e.g., In re Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1989); In re Guardianship 
of Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1990); Fuss v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr. 46 
(1991); County of Orange v. Leslie B., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797 (1993); Alicia R. v. 
Timothy M., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 868 (1994). 
251. See supra part II.C. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1997; B.A., English, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, 1992. This comment is dedicated in loving memory of my 
grandfather, R. Gerald Smemoff. 
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